The deployment of smart metering provides an immense amount of data for power grid operators and energy providers. By using this data, a more efficient and flexible power grid can be realized. However, this data also raises privacy concerns since it contains very sensitive information about customers. In this paper, we present a security and privacy-preserving metering scheme for the community customers, by utilizing the password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC). The proposed scheme will protect the community network from possible malicious behavior, and security analysis is also given in the paper.
Introduction
Today's electrical grid is changing rapidly into a smarter grid to address the demands of distributed generation. An important task for the smart grid is accurate monitoring of energy consumption and production. Smart metering is a crucial part for the realization of the vision of smart grid. In its most basic form, it describes a deployment of electric meters that enable two-way communication between meter and distribution system operator. This is often called the Ad- metering data can deduce highly private information [1] [2] . Even with measurements taken only every 15 minutes, patterns of usage for appliances can be deduced. Private information like working hours, personal habits and even religious beliefs are at risk of being no longer private through smart metering [3] .
At present, extensive studies have been conducted on the information security of smart grid [4] [5] [6] [7] . However, most of the results achieved are not applicable to the privacy problems of the smart electricity meters. In this paper, we propose a security and privacy-preserving metering scheme for the community customers, by utilizing the password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol [8] [9] [10] and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) [11] [12] [13] . The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the related background knowledge. Section 3 describes our proposed scheme while its security analysis and algorithm comparison are proved in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background Knowledge

Community Energy Management System
In the architecture of smart grid, the user's power consumption data of a community is usually sent to the power grid control center via smart meters through community gateway. In a community with n homes, the gateway need to forward every home electricity consumption data to the grid control center at regular intervals, the control center can use these data to analyze the power usage condition of the energy community. The typical energy community architecture is shown in Figure 1 . As shown in the figure, Community Energy Management System (CEMS) is an energy management center of the intelligent community, which is used to manage and record the community household energy consumption, collect user consumption data. Through the analysis of such information the energy suppliers are able to schedule and control of electrical equipment within the community, improve the electricity efficiency of the residents side, and eventually achieve the purpose of energy saving. This paper takes the energy community as the research object to establish safety authentication between the smart meters, the community energy management system, and aggregate the user data in the community. Assuming that all the data are transferred in the encrypted form, for example, the gateway need to forward an encrypted user electricity to the grid control center at regular in- After data aggregation, the energy management system will decrypt the energy consumption data first, and take aggregation operations. The aggregated data is then encrypted and sent to the power grid control center. Finally, the control center carries out the decryption of the received data to obtain the total electricity consumption of the community. This approach reduces the communication cost from community energy management system to the power grid control center, and the data stored in the control center server is the whole electricity consumption of the community instead of user's personal consumption. Therefore, the adversary cannot obtain the user's electricity consumption through the intrusion control center, so as to protect the user's privacy.
Data Privacy with Shielding Parameter
The electricity information in smart meters is a group of sensitive data to users, which need to preserve its privacy. In order to solve this problem, we introduce shielding parameters for data privacy process. User data statistics held in smart meters is aggregated to CEMS with shielding parameters. Illegal attacks against any user equipment can't obtain the real user consumption data, which ensure the user privacy and data security in the household energy network.
Supposing that a wireless network area contains n acquisition terminals, each terminal of the sensor nodes at the same time send packets to collection centers/aggregators, and no packet losses. As shown in Figure 2 , detailed steps are describes as follows:
1) Choosing a set of data generated by data collection centre/aggregator as shield parameters, these parameters meet the condition M R + will be sending to collection center.
3) Data collection centers aggregate data from terminal devices, these aggregation can be the real consumption that user use.
The ECC-Based Password Authentication and Privacy Preserving Scheme
To authenticate mutually network devices in the energy community, an enhanced ECC based password authentication scheme in is utilized. As shown in Figure 3 . To ensure the reliability and confidentiality of data transferring, the mutual authentication between community energy management systems and smart meters is necessary. As shown in Figure 3 , after a secure session has been established, the community user data can be gathered in hidden way, and the aggregated data is the total consumption of the community electricity, attacker can't get user's personal consumption data to pry user's privacy.
More specifically, this proposed scheme is divided into three stages: initialization phase, authentication phase, data privacy phase, which are described as follows.
Initialization Phase
Assuming that password Pw and secret key x are shared between CEMS and smart meters, and the CEMS A does not know the password Pw and ( ,
H ID ID Pw x π = is stored in its database. On the other hand, smart meter B has the plain password and computes π in every session. Furthermore, the trusted center generated a safety elliptic curve. Its basic parameters can be defined as follows:
where q F is the prime field of the elliptic curve, E is the elliptic curve, G is the base point of the elliptic curve, n is a prime number and be the order of G, and H is a one-way mapping function that can map any string to domain q F . 
Authentication Phase
After initialization, CEMS and smart meters must be authenticated mutually Step 
Data Privacy Phase
After the authentication, the agreement needs to be further strengthened to en- encrypted by the session key generated from the previous phase. CEMS aggregates all data received from smart meters ( )
to get the real total consumption.
Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, the security of proposed protocol is analyzed and it is shown that the proposed scheme has resilience to several well-known attacks, such as replay attack, dictionary attack and man-in the middle attack. Here, we briefly explain the security properties for the proposed protocol.
Known session key security: The session keys of different sessions are inde-pendent from each other, and it is difficult for attackers to acquire a new session key from the revealed session keys of the past sessions. Because the session key AB K is calculated from two random numbers A r and B r that are independently selected by Community EMS A and smart meter B, respectively. These random numbers will change for every session. Therefore, the proposed protocol provides the known session key security properties.
The current session key security: In the security authentication stage, the selection of random number A r , B r and generation of session key AB K occur inside their own devices of both parties without transmitting through the wireless channel, the attacker can't steal Meaningful results. In addition, because of the collision-resistant property of a one-way hash function, adversary can't ob- Privacy preserving: This scheme adopts the way of adding shielding parameters, hiding the real power data of the users, and cannot get the valid data from the users, user's actual energy consumption is only in the community energy management system, nor can it be a threat to the user's behavior and the stability of the power grid.
Conclusion
In this paper, the password authentication and elliptic curve cryptography are combined to realize the two-way secure authentication between smart meter and community energy management system in energy community. Under the pre- 
